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A. Facts and Decision 
In Kinloch Damph Ltd v Nordvik Salmon Farms Ltd,1 the pursuers supplied 
salmon smolts (young salmon) to the first defenders under two contracts. The 
contracts permitted the pursuers to retain title to the smolts, regardless of any 
growth they would undergo, until the contracts were paid in full. Under the 
first defenders' care the smolts grew to salmon thirty times their original size. 
The first defenders defaulted in payment and receivers (the second defenders) 
were appointed. The pursuers sought to have the salmon declared their 
property and delivered to them. In the event, neither of these remedies was 
practicable, because after the suit was brought the salmon came under 
suspicion of infection, and their disposition then had to follow the Diseases of 
Fish (Control) Regulations 1994. Lord Macfadyen, in giving judgment, 
therefore limited himself to expressing his conclusions on the issue of 
ownership. 
 
1 OH Court of Session (30 June 1999), unreported. The author is grateful to Professor 
Cornelius van der Merwe of Aberdeen for bringing this case to his attention.  
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 The pursuers argued that the retention-of-title clauses gave them 
ownership of the mature salmon. The defenders argued that the mature salmon 
were different goods from those supplied under the contracts, and that 
therefore the so-called "retention-of-title" clauses were, in fact, ineffective 
attempts to create a security interest over moveables without transfer of 
possession to the creditor. The defenders also argued that by their labour and 
materials they had, from the smolts, created a nova species irreducible to its 
constituent parts, and had therefore become owners of the salmon by 
specification. To the latter of these arguments the pursuers replied that 
specification would not operate where a contract controlled ownership. 
 Lord Macfadyen decided the issue of specification in favour of the 
pursuers without reaching the contract issues. He noted there was no dispute 
that specification in Scotland followed the rule of reducibility first expressed 
by Justinian: the maker of a new thing becomes its owner unless the thing can 
be reduced to its constituent elements, in which event it becomes the property 
of the owner of the materials.2 In this case, however, the rule did not come into 
play: 
In my opinion the proper scope of the doctrine is in relation to inanimate objects or 
substances created by human effort out of materials which are used up and cease to exist 
in the process of creation. There is nothing in the authorities to suggest that the doctrine is 
applicable to the process of growth of living creatures. . . . The examples in the writings 
on the subject contain no references to specificatio of growing animals. I consider that 
there is force in the [pursuers'] submission that, having regard to the much greater 
importance of animals in daily life in former times (whether the times of the Roman 
writers or those of the Scottish institutional writers), the absence of such reference is a 
strong indication that the doctrine had no such application.3 
As specification had not taken place, and the retention-of-title clauses were 
valid, the pursuers would own the mature salmon. <113> 
B. Comment 
(1) The contracts 
Roman texts can give the impression that specification was invented for the 
 
2 Justinian, Institutes, 2.1.25; Stair, Institutions, 2.1.41; Erskine, Institute, 2.1.16. See 
D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (1991), 67. 
3 3 Kinloch Damph, para 47. <113> 
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delight of lawyers.4 But in fact many rules of specification have their origin in 
manufacturing contracts, or to be exact, in manufacturing contracts that went 
wrong.5 Both the specificator and the workman take the materials of another 
and work on them. The workman becomes a specificator when he goes outside 
the contract and performs the work on his own behalf ("suo nomine"6), acting, 
as it were, like an owner. If the contract is performed properly this problem 
does not arise, and where, for example, a person had contracted to make wine 
from another's grapes and then did so, the irrelevance of specification was so 
self-evident to the Romans they hardly bothered to mention it.7 In our case, 
Lord Macfadyen declined to express an opinion on the relevance of 
specification in the face of a contract, and thereby missed the opportunity to 
make an obvious but elusive point.8 
(2) Limited examples 
To treat objects of natural growth under specification is unusual, and Lord 
Macfadyen correctly says these objects fall outside the Roman examples, such 
as those Gaius gives.9 Gaius' examples can indeed be seen as a "closed list" of 
the kinds of cases the Romans were willing to admit.10 But again, Gaius is 
dealing with cases familiar to the Romans from manufacturing contracts, and 
the Romans obviously lacked a manufacturing process to transform one kind 
 
4 See A Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (1991), 47-48. 
5 5 See T Mayer-Maly, "Specifikation: Leitfälle, Begriffsbildung, Rechtsinstitut" 
(1956) 73 Savigny Zeitschrift (r A) 133; T Mayer-Maly, Locatio Conductio: Eine 
Untersuchung zum klassischen römischen Recht  (1956), 76; J A C Thomas, "Non solet 
locatio dominium mutare", in Mélanges Meylan (1963), vol 1, 351: 
The instances discussed are virtually all cases like the making of clothes, vases, rings, etc, 
out of given materials – cases, that is, where, in the appropriate circumstances, there 
would be a locatio operis faciendi. In short, the cases discussed in connection with 
specificatio in juristic literature are fairly concrete cases that could really arise and not 
situations of the sort to delight purely academic discussion as abstract problems. 
6 See especially D 41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cottidianarum), but also D 41.1.25 
(Callistratus 2 institutiones); 24.1.31.1 (Pomponius 14 ad Sabinum); 41.1.27.1 (Pomponius 30 
ad Sabinum). See generally B C Stoop, "Non solet locatio dominium mutare: some remarks on 
specificatio in classical Roman law" (1999) 66 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 8. 
7 See D Daube, "The self-understood in legal history" (1973) 18 Juridical Review (n s) 
128. 
8 Surprisingly missed, given the subject, in T Roberts, "A reassessment of historical 
theories on specificatio and the requirement of good faith" (2002) 7 SLPQ 180. 
9 Gaius, Institutes, 2.79; D 41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cottidianarum). 
10 J A C Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976), 175. 
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of living thing into another. They did of course regularly deal with problems 
relating to living things and natural growth, but problems like these could 
usually be handled in a satisfactory way under the rules on acquisition of 
fruits.11 If they did not use specification in such cases, it was because the state 
of manufacture did not make it necessary, not because they categorically 
excluded natural growth from its scope. In this respect it is suggested that the 
decision is not sound. 
(3) Reducibility and identity 
The reducibility rule12 nevertheless makes one hesitate to apply specification 
to objects of natural growth. This is because virtually everything that grows is 
irreducible, and applying the rule mechanically would almost always give 
ownership to the maker. At bottom the problem is that in ordinary 
manufacturing processes, "irreducibility" is a guarantee that the original thing 
has been <114> destroyed, but in the case of objects of natural growth, there is 
no such guarantee: these develop from one state to another without any 
obvious destruction taking place. Of course one could be pedantic and say, for 
example, that in our case the cells which comprised the smolts were destroyed 
as the salmon matured, but this only serves to highlight what specification 
really requires: not destruction per se, but a destructive event that changes the 
identity of the original thing. 
 In Roman law, change of identity was not simply a "component of 
specification": it was the problem for which specification was the answer. If a 
person brought an action to recover an item of property, and the property had 
been substantially altered by some manufacturing process, the praetor would 
understandably hesitate to allow that person to prosecute the recovery of "his" 
property.13 It was necessary first to determine who was entitled to claim to be 
owner, and on this point views famously differed. But views did not differ on 
the fact that the property had changed its identity. Even the Sabinians, who 
would give ownership to the owner of the materials, acknowledged this;14 the 
owner of the materials did not "remain the owner of the materials" in their new 
 
11 With some departures, e.g., the obligation of a good-faith possessor to account for 
unconsumed fruits. 
12 Above, note 2. <114> 
13 F Wieacker, "Spezifikation: Schulprobleme und Sachprobleme", in W Kunkel and H 
J Wolff (eds), Festschrift Rabel (1954), vol 2, 288. 
14 Thomas, "Non solet", 351–52: "On this basis the Schools would thus agree that a new 
thing existed in place of the materials; it is the disposal of the new thing which is in dispute." 
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form,15 but became a new owner of a new thing. The main point, however, is 
that the Romans did not actively seek out identity problems to solve. If an 
owner of smolts had come before the praetor to vindicate the salmon which 
grew from his smolts, the praetor, knowing where salmon come from, would 
have readily ordered the matter to be heard without seeking the advice of 
jurists. Nothing had happened to the smolts to make them difficult to identify 
as the property of the owner of the smolts. In other words, there is no problem. 
That is why specification did not take place in this case. 
(4) Specification of living things 
Can there ever be specification in this kind of case? Some might argue that the 
answer must be no, because nowadays a new thing can be genetically 
identified with the old. But this is wrong: the issue is identity, not 
identifiability, as is clear from the fact that specification is present even when 
one knows, e.g., that this wine came from those grapes.16 Genetic analysis of 
the wine would not have told the Romans anything they did not already know. 
What makes specification of living things rare and unlikely is the fact that 
living things, in growing and developing, do so according to a biological 
pattern that experience has made familiar. Identity will never be an issue so 
long as salmon develop from smolts, oaks from acorns, etc. 
 However, a person by his labour might alter the natural pattern of 
development in such a way that the developed thing can no longer be 
identified with its predecessor. If he does so he could acquire ownership by 
specification, because he has disrupted the sole basis by which the product is 
identified with the materials. This clearly did not take place in the case under 
discussion: the defenders, however substantially they contributed to the 
rearing of the salmon, did not change the natural pattern of development of 
smolts to salmon. A California case from some years ago, however, describes 
what may be a genuine example of altered natural development.17 Researchers 
at the University of California harvested cells from a medical patient and then 
used <115> them to develop a culture which could reproduce indefinitely. 
 
15 Cf H Hausmaninger and W Selb, Römisches Privatrecht, 8th edn (1997), 228. 
16 The court in Kinloch Damph received a report of the Director of the Institute of 
Aquaculture at the University of Stirling; the report asserted that, biologically, smolts and 
salmon are of the same species (Kinloch Damph, paras 24-25). The point was not contested by 
the defenders, and it did not need to be. 
17 Moore v Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal 3d 120, 793 P 2d 479 (1990). 
The case is discussed briefly in L Skene, "Proprietary rights in human bodies, body parts and 
tissue" (2002) 22 Legal Studies 120–21. <115> 
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Typically these cells would simply die,18 but the researchers altered the natural 
pattern and by their labour created something new. The case, as David 
Johnston has pointed out, was ripe for discussion of specification,19 and the 
patient might even have won the argument. California being a Common Law 
jurisdiction, however, the patient sued for conversion, and lost. 
 
 
18 18 51 Cal 3d at 127 n 2. 
19 D Johnston, "The renewal of the old" (1997) 80 CLJ 92-93. 
